These changes form part of the draft law “Useful, Swift and Effective Sanction” (Sanction Utile, Rapide et Effective – SURE), which has sparked extensive public debate and a wave of protests from the legal community against the proposed reforms and reductions in judicial funding (notably, lawyers’ strikes took place in Paris under the slogan “Justice Morte” (“Justice is Dead”), as well as in Nantes and Angers).
The central and most controversial provision of the bill is the introduction of a procédure de jugement des crimes reconnus – a plea-based mechanism extending to serious offences. Under this procedure, a defendant would be able to plead guilty and receive a reduced sentence (in certain cases, up to two-thirds of the statutory maximum) through a simplified process: without a full adversarial trial, without the examination of witnesses and experts, with the possibility of remote participation via videoconference, and subject to limited judicial scrutiny.
At the same time, the bill proposes to abandon a number of existing mechanisms for the individualisation of punishment, including restrictions on the use of suspended sentences, and also envisages eliminating pre-trial settlement mechanisms altogether.
According to proponents of the reform within the government, the current CJIP framework enables large corporations to effectively “buy their way out” of criminal prosecution, thereby undermining the principle of equality before the law. It is noted that, unlike in ordinary criminal proceedings, companies entering into a CJIP are not required to admit guilt and do not incur a criminal conviction, allowing them to continue participating in public procurement. In this regard, the government emphasises the need to transition to a model based on judicial convictions rather than negotiated settlements.
Criticism of the CJIP mechanism also exists at the level of public perception, as individuals do not have access to the same opportunities to enter into agreements with law enforcement authorities as multinational corporations (in France, unlike, for example, in the United States, such agreements are available only to legal entities).
At the same time, supporters of maintaining CJIPs – including representatives of the legal profession and the prosecution – warn that abolishing this instrument could significantly reduce the effectiveness of enforcement in economic and corruption-related offences. Without the possibility of CJIPs, proceedings involving corporations may be protracted for years, and some cases may be discontinued without the imposition of final sanctions (prior to the introduction of CJIPs, only two international corruption cases reached trial in France over a 25-year period).
Moreover, eliminating CJIPs would increase legal and reputational risks for businesses. The inability to resolve cases out of court would necessitate full public proceedings and expose companies to the risk of criminal conviction, potentially resulting in restrictions on participation in certain types of activities. More broadly, this may negatively affect France’s investment attractiveness.
It is noteworthy that France has previously expanded the scope of CJIPs, for example by extending their application to environmental offences. The proposed reform thus signals a potential shift in the approach to combating economic crime – from a model focused on incentivising compliance and cooperation to one based on formalised admissions of guilt and judicial adjudication. Some sources link this shift to the broader political context and preparations for the 2027 presidential elections, amid increasingly pronounced anti-corporate rhetoric.
At present, the bill has been adopted by the National Assembly (the lower house of Parliament) at first reading. It is now to be considered by the Senate, where similarly intense debate over the future of the CJIP mechanism is expected.
*A Convention Judiciaire d’Intérêt Public (CJIP) is the French equivalent of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), widely used in other jurisdictions. Introduced in 2016, it serves as an alternative to criminal prosecution. A CJIP is concluded between a company and the public prosecutor prior to any public hearing and may include the following conditions:
- payment of a fine calculated in proportion to the unlawful benefit obtained (capped at 30% of the company’s average annual turnover over the previous three years), taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors;
- implementation or enhancement of a compliance programme under the supervision of the French Anti-Corruption Agency (for a maximum period of three years);
- compensation for damage caused.
As with DPAs, such agreements offer advantages for both parties:
- the legal entity is not required to admit guilt; the facts set out in the CJIP cannot be used to initiate subsequent criminal proceedings; and certain additional sanctions that may follow a court conviction are avoided;
- prosecutors are not required to bring the case to trial, thereby avoiding the significant time and financial resources needed to gather extensive evidence and defend their position in lengthy proceedings. Between 2016 and 2024, French prosecutors imposed approximately €4 billion in fines through CJIPs, while the total amount of fines across all procedures during the same period was approximately €8 billion. Thus, CJIPs concluded within a matter of months account for roughly half of all fines imposed, compared to cases that often take years to investigate and litigate.
