The new Policy replaces all previously existing component- and district-level corporate enforcement frameworks and applies to all corporate criminal matters, except for antitrust violations. In effect, DOJ has moved away from its prior fragmented approach, under which different components and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices applied their own standards in corporate enforcement matters.
A key practical consequence of this development is the extension of the CEP to national security cases. Following its publication, DOJ’s National Security Division (NSD) confirmed that the unified framework now applies to violations of export controls, sanctions laws, and other matters within its jurisdiction. As a result, the DOJ’s unified approach now covers not only traditional corporate fraud and corruption cases, but also offenses in sensitive national security-related areas.
The Policy is positioned as a tool to enhance predictability, transparency, and consistency in enforcement. It explicitly states that the CEP is intended to incentivize early voluntary self-disclosure of corporate misconduct, facilitate timely investigations, promote prompt remediation, ensure consistency across the Department, and support the identification and prosecution of individuals responsible for wrongdoing.
Like the previously applicable Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, the new framework is based on three potential resolution pathways:
- Where a company voluntarily self-discloses misconduct, fully cooperates, and timely and appropriately remediates, and no aggravating circumstances are present, it is entitled to a declination. Notably, the new CEP establishes a more favorable baseline outcome: whereas earlier frameworks often provided only a presumption of a non-prosecution agreement (NPA), the new Policy prioritizes declinations where the criteria are satisfied;
- In “near miss” cases – where a company acted in good faith but failed to meet all formal requirements for voluntary self-disclosure or where aggravating factors are present – DOJ will enter into an NPA, limit its duration to less than three years, generally not require an independent compliance monitor, and reduce the fine by 50% to 75% from the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range;
- In all other cases, prosecutors retain significant discretion in determining the appropriate resolution, with the maximum fine reduction capped at 50%.
The most notable change compared to the 2025 version concerns “near miss” cases. Previously, such cases were eligible for a fixed 75% reduction in fines; the new CEP introduces a broader range of 50% to 75%, effectively expanding prosecutorial discretion. This suggests that, despite the stated goal of increasing predictability, the updated CEP may, in some respects, lead to less certain outcomes for companies.
The DOJ has also clarified its approach to corporate recidivism as an aggravating factor. Under the new Policy, prosecutors may consider not only criminal resolutions within the past five years, but also similar misconduct occurring outside that period. As a result, the recidivism criterion has been broadened and potentially strengthened.
Another important development concerns the mechanics of self-disclosure. Whereas prior frameworks often required disclosure to the “correct” DOJ component, the CEP adopts a more flexible approach: good-faith disclosures made to any DOJ component may be credited if the matter is subsequently referred to the appropriate authority. In addition, the Policy provides that, in certain circumstances, disclosures made to federal regulators, state or local authorities, or civil enforcement bodies may also be taken into account, although this remains subject to DOJ discretion.
The Policy also places particular emphasis on early engagement with companies. DOJ states that prosecutors should seek to obtain sufficient information as early as possible to determine whether a disclosure qualifies for a declination or a “near miss” resolution and, where appropriate, communicate that determination to the company as soon as practicable. While this may incentivize earlier engagement with authorities, the CEP does not establish specific timelines for such feedback.
At the same time, the introduction of a unified framework does not resolve all uncertainties. Experts note that the CEP largely mirrors the 2025 policy, with the primary change being the replacement of “Criminal Division” with “Department.” Accordingly, the significance of the new Policy lies less in a substantive overhaul of incentives and more in the centralization of enforcement and the elimination of the prior “patchwork” system. It remains unclear, however, to what extent previously adopted component-level programs – particularly the more favorable regime recently introduced by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) – will continue to influence enforcement practice in specific offices.
